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BORDER SEARCHES OF LAPTOP COMPUTERS AFTER





The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that border
searches of laptop computers do not require reasonable
suspicion. The decision, in United States v. Arnold, reflects the
continued intent of the Ninth Circuit—along with the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals—to continue analyzing laptop computer
searches under the traditional border search doctrine. This
article will examine recent laptop computer search cases in light
of the border search doctrine and will consider the implications
for lawyers and business professionals who travel abroad with
confidential information on laptops and other electronic-storage
devices. The article will also consider the implications of such
searches on the ethical duty of confidentiality, the attorney-
client privilege, and trade secrets law.
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<1>As our society becomes increasingly globalized, technology
continues to develop smaller, more powerful computerized devices.
As our penchant for carrying information on and communicating via
such devices increases, lawyers and business professionals find 1
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themselves carrying vital information all around the world. Whether
it be a laptop computer; a memory stick; a personal digital assistant
(PDA); a Blackberry, iPhone, or other “smartphone”; or a
conventional cellular phone, electronic devices continue to increase
in popularity as they allow individuals to conduct business from
almost anywhere. Recent cases involving border searches of laptop
computers have raised questions concerning the privacy of
information carried on electronic devices. Under the traditional
border search doctrine, when individuals enter the country, officials
do not need a reason to search the individuals or their belongings.
However, with the continuing advances in technology, the issue
becomes whether the border search doctrine extends to information
contained on personal computerized and electronic devices, and
what happens when such information is found during a search.
<2>The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in United States
v. Arnold that border searches of laptop computers do not require
reasonable suspicion.2  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals—the
other circuit to have definitively decided this issue—also has held
that such searches do not require reasonable suspicion.3  Other
courts have similarly upheld searches of laptop computers by
customs officials as falling within the traditional border search
doctrine.4  This article considers the evolution of the border search
doctrine and carefully examines its application to the cases
involving searches of laptop computers. The article then considers
the potential impact of such searches on the ethical duty of
confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege, and the abandonment
of trade secrets doctrine. Ultimately, the article concludes that an
increase in laptop searches combined with courts currently allowing
such searches should cause professionals traveling internationally to
take note.
THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE: ROUTINE VS. NON-ROUTINE SEARCHES
<3>Border searches of persons entering the United States have long
been considered permissible.5  The United States Supreme Court
has consistently held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures is qualitatively different
at the border because of the nation’s security interests;6  protecting
our borders is essential to the nation’s health, safety, and
welfare.7  As a result, “routine searches of the persons and effects
of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.”8
<4>Courts have struggled to define what constitutes a “routine”
search and what constitutes a “non-routine” search. In Montoya de
Hernandez, the Court suggested in a footnote that border searches
such as strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches might be
considered “non-routine” and therefore require a different level of
2
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suspicion than other border searches.9  The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has noted that the degree of intrusiveness is one of the
most important factors in determining whether a search is routine
or non-routine.10  In United States v. Ramos-Saenz, the Ninth
Circuit held that a border search becomes non-routine “only when it
reaches the degree of intrusiveness present in a strip search or
body cavity search.”11
<5>The border search doctrine has been extended to include the
examination of luggage and other containers by x-ray or other
technological means.12  In United States v. Okafor, after an x-ray
examination, customs officials emptied the defendant’s suitcase as
he was entering the country at Los Angeles International Airport.13
Suspecting a hidden compartment, the officials inserted a needle
probe into the luggage and detected cocaine.14  The Supreme Court
upheld the completed x-ray as a routine search, holding that such
an examination may be done at the border without any showing of
particularized suspicion “so long as the means of examination are
not personally intrusive, do not significantly harm the objects
scrutinized, and do not unduly delay transit.”15  The court explained
that border searches become non-routine only when they reach the
level of invasiveness of a strip search or body cavity search.16  The
court, however, did not need to decide whether the search was
routine or non-routine since the court held that the officers had
reasonable suspicion.
<6>The Supreme Court has consistently upheld quite intrusive
searches as within the scope of the border search doctrine. In
United States v. Flores-Montano, for example, the Supreme Court
held that a defendant who entered the country by car did not have
a privacy interest in the car’s fuel tank, and therefore the complete
disassembly of the fuel tank did not require reasonable suspicion.17
The court stated that the inquiry of whether a search was “routine”
or “non-routine simply did not apply to searches of vehicles.18  As a
result, the court limited the inquiry concerning whether a search
was routine to situations involving searches of a person and his or
her personal effects. However, the court seemingly left open the
question of whether or not a “particularly offensive” search, or one
with exceptional property damage, might require a heightened level
of suspicion.19
THE DOCTRINE EXTENDED: LAPTOP COMPUTERS
<7>Recently, courts have had to decide how to apply the border
search doctrine to searches of laptop computers. This section will
consider the earlier cases on border searches of laptops and a
subsequent section will discuss the Arnold case. In United States v.
Ickes, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
3
Offenbecher: Border Searches of Laptop Computers after <i>United States v. Arn
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2008
Border Searches of Laptop Computers after United States v. Arnold: Implications for Traveling Professionals >> Shidler Journal of Law, Commerce & Technology
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/vol5/a09Offenbecher.html[3/24/2010 12:47:26 PM]
that electronic files contained on disks and a computer found in the
defendant’s van constituted “cargo” within the meaning of a federal
statute authorizing searches.20  There, the defendant was
attempting to enter the United States from Canada at a border
crossing when officials searched his van and found incriminating
material, including images of child pornography on his laptop and
disks.21
<8>In Ickes, the court upheld the statutory authority of customs
officials under the Tariff Act.22  The court explained that Congress
had been emphatic in its empowerment of customs officials to
search vehicles entering the country:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board
of any vessel or vehicle at any place in the United
States or within the customs waters, . . . or at any
other authorized place . . . and examine the manifest
and other documents and papers and examine, inspect,
and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof
and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board.23
<9>The court rejected the defendant’s contention that the term
“cargo” did not encompass the computer and the disks and noted
that “to hold otherwise would undermine the longstanding practice
of seizing goods at the border even when the type of good is not
specified in the statute.”24  Further, the court held that the search
was reasonable simply because it occurred at the border.25  The
court did not mention the distinction between routine and non-
routine border searches. In addition, the court stated that the
border search doctrine was not subject to a First Amendment
exception.26  The court explained that given the reluctance of
courts to allow First Amendment exceptions to warrant applications,
it declined to create such an exception for border searches.27
<10>Shortly after Ickes, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the issue of a border search of a laptop computer. In
United States v. Romm, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld,
as routine, the search of the defendant’s laptop computer at an
airport upon entry to the United States.28  Because the petitioner
had raised the issue for the first time in his reply brief, the court
declined to answer the question of whether the search was non-
routine and therefore entitled to heightened scrutiny.29  However,
in a footnote, the court commented that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Flores-Montano “suggests that the search of a traveler’s
property at the border will always be deemed ‘routine,’ absent a
showing the search technique risks damage to the searched
property.”30  Romm seems to suggest that all laptop searches will
be permissible as long as the search does not risk damaging the
computer.
4
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<11>In another recent case, United States v. Irving, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a border search of computer disks
when reasonable suspicion was present. The court declined to
decide whether the search was routine or non-routine because
there was reasonable suspicion for the search.31  In Irving, the
customs officials had information suggesting that the defendant had
traveled abroad to engage in illegal activities.32  A subsequent
search turned up floppy disks containing child pornography.33  The
court examined the information the officials had about the
defendant and his travels and determined that the customs officials
had a reasonable basis for examining the disks. Therefore, the
court did not need to inquire into whether the search was routine or
non-routine.34  The court, however, suggested that absent
reasonable suspicion a court would have to determine whether the
search was routine or non-routine.35
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. ARNOLD
<12>In April 2008, the Ninth Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit and
held that a border search of a laptop computer did not require
reasonable suspicion.36  The decision is particularly important
because it reversed a district court decision that had held
reasonable suspicion was required for border searches of laptop
computers.37  In United States v. Arnold, the defendant was
charged with several counts related to possession of child
pornography.38  While waiting in the customs line at Los Angeles
International Airport, the defendant was selected for secondary
questioning.39  After questioning, Customs and Border Patrol
officers searched his luggage and obtained a laptop computer, a
separate hard drive, a flash drive, and six compact discs.40  An
examination of these items revealed images depicting what the
officers believed to be child pornography.41  The district court
granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the
officers needed reasonable suspicion to search the laptop and that
the government did not have reasonable suspicion in this particular
case.42  After noting that non-routine, invasive border searches
require reasonable suspicion, the court found that “the search of a
computer hard drive and similar electronic storage devices
implicates privacy and dignity interests of a person.”43  The court
stated that “[p]eople keep all types of personal information on
computers, including diaries, personal letters, medical information,
photos and financial records. Attorneys' computers may contain
confidential client information. Reporters' computers may contain
information about confidential sources or story leads. Inventors'
and corporate executives' computers may contain trade secrets.”44
Because the search of a laptop was similar to more invasive
searches of the person, the court held that reasonable suspicion 5
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was required to search a laptop.45
<13>The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed the
district court’s decision.46  The appellate court stated that courts
have long recognized that border searches of closed containers can
be done without reasonable suspicion.47  Specifically, the court
noted cases where searches of briefcases, purses, wallets, pockets,
papers found in pockets, pictures, films, and other graphic materials
were all held permissible even absent reasonable suspicion.48  The
court went on to explain that the Supreme Court has only limited
the border search power when intrusive searches of the person
occur, or in certain situations involving the destruction of
property.49  It rejected the district court’s reliance on cases
involving searches of the person, stating that the application of a
sliding intrusiveness scale to a case involving the search of property
is simply misplaced.50  Distinguishing from searches of persons, the
court essentially rejected the distinction between routine and non-
routine searches, stating that the terms are merely descriptive and
are inapplicable to searches involving property.51  As a result, the
court held that “reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs
officials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage
devices at the border.”52
<14>The Court of Appeals went further than merely rejecting the
reasoning used by the district court. Perhaps in an effort to show
that it had considered other potential arguments, the Ninth Circuit
addressed additional exceptions and challenges to the border search
rule that had not been discussed by the district court. The Court of
Appeals noted that Flores-Montano left open two possible narrow
grounds upon which reasonable suspicion might be required.53  The
first exception not addressed in Flores-Montano is whether
“exceptional damage to property” occurred.54  However, the Arnold
court declined to consider this issue because the defendant in
Arnold had never raised the issue. The second potential exception is
whether the search was particularly offensive.55  The Arnold court
explained that the defendant failed to show how the search of his
laptop was logically different from other traditional border searches
of luggage that the Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed;56  the
defendant’s comparison of a laptop search to the search of a home
was without merit because the Supreme Court has rejected
applying heightened Fourth Amendment protection to property
simply because it has privacy interests similar to those associated
with a home.57  Furthermore, the court stated that in other
situations courts have refused to find searches “particularly
offensive” simply because, as is the case with electronic storage
devices, the container has an increased storage capacity.58  Finally,
the court adopted the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Ickes and
refused to create a First Amendment exception to the border search
6
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doctrine.59
WHEN CAN LAPTOP COMPUTERS BE SEARCHED?
<15>While the cases discussed above involve child pornographic
imagery, the more important issue for traveling businesspersons
and lawyers is whether or not these decisions give customs officials
the right to search and seize information other than child
pornography. These cases do not distinguish between child
pornography and other types of information (i.e., attorney-client
privileged information, company strategies, or business trade
secrets). Indeed, there have been recent cases in which
international business travelers have had their laptop computers
seized and searched.60  Travelers and advocacy organizations have
become increasingly worried about electronic searches and several
organizations have filed lawsuits concerning this matter.61
However, because searches of businesspersons and lawyers have
not generally resulted in criminal prosecutions, there are no
published cases addressing border searches of laptops in those
situations. Thus, the consideration of the border search doctrine as
applied to traveling professionals takes place in the context of the
published cases involving child pornography.
<16>Currently, the law provides that laptop computers can be
searched by customs officials without any reasonable suspicion.
After Romm, there was hope that laptop searches might still be
subject to an inquiry into whether the search was routine or non-
routine. In Arnold, just three years later, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the application of the routine and non-routine distinction to
searches involving laptop computers.62  There, the Ninth Circuit was
considering a district court opinion that, if upheld, would have
changed the face of the border search doctrine by requiring
reasonable suspicion for laptop searches.63  Perhaps as a result, the
court takes the time to address, not only the district court’s
reasoning, but also the Flores-Montano exceptions to the First
Amendment argument.64  By rejecting the possibility that a laptop
search, by its intrusive nature, could be a non-routine search
requiring heightened scrutiny, Arnold refuses to apply the standard
involved in searches of persons to those of electronic storage
devices.65
<17>Further, while Ickes deals more narrowly with a statute
authorizing searches of vehicles and vessels entering the
country,66  the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation likely gives officials
carte blanche to search everything in the vehicle—including
confidential documents. By rejecting the First Amendment challenge
to the search, the Fourth Circuit may have foreclosed all
constitutional avenues of attack. As this article will later discuss,
other doctrines such as the attorney-client privilege and the ethical 7
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duty of confidentiality may likely restrict how information obtained
during a search may be used. However, Ickes and Arnold show that
challenges to the inherent power to make the search may be futile.
As a result, the current state of the law suggests that customs
agents may search ordinary travelers’ laptop computers without
probable cause, a warrant, or reasonable suspicion, and obtain
admissible evidence that may be used against the traveler in later
litigation.
<18>The Irving case, while facially different than the above cases,
offers insight into how the courts will apply the border search
doctrine. In Irving, the Second Circuit skirted the inquiry into
whether or not the search was routine or non-routine by finding
reasonable suspicion based on information the customs officials had
concerning the defendant. However, as discussed above, reasonable
suspicion is not needed for border searches; customs officials can
search individuals and their property absent any articulable reason.
Further, as with all reasonable suspicion inquiries, the court
retroactively applied the analysis after the officials had found the
incriminating evidence. As a result, the Irving court may have
paved the way for other courts to avoid inquiring into whether the
border search was routine by identifying limited facts sufficient to
constitute reasonable suspicion.
THE ETHICAL DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY FOR LAWYERS TRAVELING
ABROAD
<19>It is important to consider the duty of confidentiality to
understand whether lawyers violate the ethical rules of professional
conduct when traveling through customs checkpoints with laptops
and other electronic devices that contain confidential client
information. The ethical duty of confidentiality is one of the
hallmarks of the legal profession and the attorney-client
relationship. Model Rule of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) 1.6(a)
states that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent,
the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted . . . .”67  Because
client confidences might be exposed during a border search of a
laptop, it is important to know if such disclosure constitutes an
ethical violation.
<20>Based on the text and comments of the MRPC, it seems
unlikely that courts or other disciplinary tribunals would find that a
lawyer violated the ethical duty of confidentiality simply by traveling
through border checkpoints with confidential client information on
his or her laptop computer. The comments to the MRPC state that a
lawyer must act competently to safeguard information relating to
the representation of a client against disclosure.68  Competent
representation is defined by the MRPC as “the legal knowledge,
8
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skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”69  The MRPC comments further explain that
When transmitting a communication that includes
information relating to the representation of a client,
the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent
the information from coming into the hands of
unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not
require that the lawyer use special security measures if
the method of communication affords a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however,
may warrant special precautions.70
<21>As discussed above, the information is at risk of being seen
and read by border officials who have the apparent right to open
laptop computers and look at the information contained within.
Traveling through customs checkpoints with client confidences on a
laptop is not affirmative disclosure under MRPC 1.6(a) and does not
violate the explicit prohibition against revealing information. In
addition, the risk of “inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure” is low,
and traveling with client confidences in an electronic format is a
widespread practice among lawyers.71  Finally, the practice among
many professionals to password protect computer access and other
information would likely be considered a reasonable precaution
against disclosure under the MRPC.
<22>If the exposure of confidential communications during a border
search is analogized to the interception of email communications,
lawyers likely would not violate their ethical duty by traveling with
such information. In 1999, the American Bar Association (ABA)
issued an ethics opinion stating that a lawyer may transmit
information relating to the representation of a client by means of
unencrypted email without violating the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.72  The opinion noted that the “mode of transmission
affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a technological and
legal standpoint.”73  Most states have adopted positions similar to
that of the ABA.74  If a similar analysis was applied to border
searches of laptops, lawyers would not violate their ethical duty of
confidentiality by traveling with confidential information, even if that
information was exposed during a search.
<23>However, some states have taken a different stance than the
ABA regarding attorney-client communications.75  For example, two
states have cautioned attorneys to seek client consent or inform
clients of the risks before communicating via email.76  Other states
have even advised against communicating sensitive client
information by way of email.77  If courts or disciplinary tribunals
were to apply these standards to the border search situation, they
could find that attorneys had violated the ethical duty of
confidentiality by traveling through border checkpoints with 9
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confidential information on laptop computers.
WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND TRAVELING LAWYERS
<24>The inadvertent disclosure of information during a border
search also raises the question of whether such a disclosure
constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-
client privilege protects certain types of communications between
attorneys and clients. The policy behind the privilege is that such
information should be inadmissible at trial in order to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients.78
The privilege is an evidentiary doctrine that is governed by the
common law79  and protects communications between attorneys
and clients unless the protection is waived.80
<25>When considering inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information during discovery, courts have generally taken three
approaches to determine when and whether the attorney-client
privilege has been waived.81  Under the lenient approach, disclosure
of client confidences generally does not create a waiver of the
privilege.82  Under the middle-of-the-road approach, courts employ
a multi-faceted reasonableness test in determining whether the
privilege has been waived.83  These courts have considered factors
such as the reasonableness of precaution taken to prevent
disclosure, number of inadvertent disclosures, extent of the
disclosures, promptness of measures taken to rectify the disclosure,
and “whether the overriding interest of justice would be served by
relieving the party of its error.”84  Finally, under the strict approach,
disclosure is the equivalent of waiving the attorney-client privilege:
“[I]f a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must treat the
confidentiality of attorney-client communications like jewels-if not
crown jewels. Short of court-compelled disclosure, or other equally
extraordinary circumstances, we will not distinguish between
various degrees of ‘voluntariness’ in waivers of the attorney-client
privilege.”85
<26>If we apply the principles used in the context of inadvertent
disclosure during discovery, it seems unlikely that courts would hold
that disclosure of privileged information, by way of a border search,
constitutes waiver of the attorney-client privilege. However, the
existence of the privilege depends upon which approach a court
uses. Courts employing the lenient approach likely would not find
such a disclosure had waived the privilege because those courts are
more likely to forgive disclosures without finding a waiver of
privilege. Courts using the middle-of-the-road approach also likely
would not find that the privilege had been waived because traveling
with privileged information in compact computerized devices is
commonplace and widely accepted. These middle-of-the-road
approach courts likely would find that such travel does not 10
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constitute a failure to take reasonable precautions against
disclosure, particularly if the disclosure is a single instance.
However, some courts could interpret “reasonable precautions”
differently. For example, as mentioned in the previous section,
some jurisdictions require consent prior to communicating by email
or advise against sending sensitive client information over email at
all. Courts in these jurisdictions might define “reasonable
precautions” in a more exacting manner. These courts may find that
“reasonable precautions” require affirmative action, such as
protecting client communications with a complicated password
system or by storing the information on a home server to be
accessed once the attorney was abroad.
<27>Similar to the middle-of-the-road approach, under the strict
approach, it is also unclear whether or not disclosure during a
border search would constitute a waiver. Courts using the strict
approach could determine that attorneys traveling the world with
privileged information on computerized devices—in light of the fact
that such information can be examined at will by customs officials—
have waived the privilege by failing to take adequate precautions
and failing to treat their clients’ information as “crown jewels.”
Another possibility is that these courts could find that disclosure by
way of a border search is equivalent to court compelled disclosure
or equally extraordinary circumstances. Thus, such action could also
be found to not constitute a waiver under even the strict approach
to attorney-client privilege waiver.86  Consequently, whether or not
a court would find that disclosure during a border search constitutes
a waiver of the attorney-client privilege depends on which approach
to privilege waiver the court takes, as well as possibly the
jurisdiction’s general acceptance of electronic communications.
TRAVELING PROFESSIONALS AND THE POSSIBLE ABANDONMENT OF
TRADE SECRETS
<28>International business travelers who travel with proprietary
information on electronic storage devices may be concerned about
the disclosure of trade secrets to customs and border patrol agents.
However, disclosure during a border search is unlikely to cause
trade secrets to lose their protected status. American courts
generally create a cause of action for the disclosure or misuse of
trade secrets by persons who obtain knowledge of the secret in
certain circumstances.87  General public disclosure of a trade secret
results in abandonment that can cause the secret to lose its
protected status and preclude parties from recovering for the
disclosure or misuse of the secret.88  However, situations with a
limited disclosure may not result in abandonment.89  Courts have
also held that disclosure of trade secrets to public officials does not
result in abandonment.90
<29>The disclosure of trade secrets to customs or border agents as 11
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a result of a border search of a laptop computer or other electronic
storage device is unlikely to constitute abandonment such that the
trade secrets would lose their protected status.91  First, the
compelled disclosure of trade secrets resulting from a border search
of a laptop computer is not a public disclosure. Second, the
disclosure of trade secrets to a few agents is likely to be considered
a limited disclosure; the information is viewed by a select group of
individuals who are conducting the search, and, as noted above,
limited disclosures of trade secrets may not result in abandonment.
Finally, Customs and Border Patrol agents are probably considered
“public officials.” In Plastic & Metal Fabricators, Inc., the court held
that mere “inspection by a public official does not contradict the
element of secrecy.”92  Consequently, the disclosure of trade
secrets resulting from a border search of a laptop computer is
unlikely to constitute the abandonment of a trade secret.
CONCLUSION
<30>The Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have affirmatively held
that border searches of laptop computers and other electronic
storage devices do not require reasonable suspicion. Under the
current cases, information acquired by customs officials during such
searches is admissible in litigation as fruit of a permissible border
search. However, if the information is by nature an attorney-client
communication, a claim of attorney-client privilege is likely to
succeed. Further, it is unlikely that those who travel internationally
with electronically stored information are violating the ethical duty
of confidentiality or are abandoning trade secrets. While the
reported cases in this area of law deal with child pornography,
nothing in the decisions limits the scope of the border search
doctrine or restricts officials from searching other types of
information. While laptop searches are rare, traveling professionals
have been targeted as well. Though the risk is low, lawyers and
business professionals who travel abroad with confidential and
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